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ISOLATION OF ACTION EXECUTION FAILURES
FOR COGNITIVE ROBOTS
SUMMARY
Robots execute actions in the physical world in order to reach their goals. They may
face several failures during the execution of actions in their plans due to dynamic and
partially observable structure of the physical world. For example, an object may not be
grasped successfully by the robot due to a wrong grasp position. Another failure may
occur when vision algorithm of the robot fails to recognise an object. Furthermore, the
vision algorithm may falsely classify an object. Yet in another case, state of an object
may be changed by another agent. These failures should be detected by the robot,
and a reasoning procedure should take place to diagnose the causes of the failures.
During the execution, deciding on an abnormal situation about the execution is called
Failure Detection. In order to detect a failure, a monitoring procedure must be applied
in both plan and action level. Finding the root cause of a failure situation is called
Failure Isolation. Although failure detection is an important issue for robotics, failure
isolation is also needed for robust execution. To do so, the robot should apply an
isolation procedure.
A robot should interpret one or more sensors (touch, pressure, vision etc.) in order
to monitor the execution and infer about failure cases. Therefore, the robot should
interpret the scene and extract related information about the current situation. In order
to accurately isolate a failure, the robot should have the models of the possible failures
that can occur in the environment during the execution. The cause of the failure may
not be related to the action in execution at an instant time step. It may be depending on
a previously executed action’s undesired effects or an external event. For example, in
the blocks world domain, if a base block is not properly constructed, a stack action may
destroy the unbalanced tower. Analysis of these kind of failures should be done from
a temporal dimension. Furthermore, there may be more than one cause of a failure. In
such cases, a temporal and probabilistic model is required in order to isolate these type
of failures.
A Hierarchical Hidden Markov Model (HHMM)-based failure isolation method is
presented in this thesis in order to explain the failure cases with relevant facts after they
are detected. Failure models are represented as distinct HHMMs. During the execution
of the actions in the plan, these models are updated while the scene is interpreted.
Relations between the actions and the failure models are used to eliminate unnecessary
model updates during the execution. In case of a failure, Viterbi algorithm is invoked to
find the most likely explanation of the failure. Considering the calculated probabilities,
the candidate models responsible for the failure are found.
Several failure cases on a real robot are investigated in order to analyse the performance
of the proposed method. The results show that using a probabilistic method allows
to diagnose failures when there are more than one cause of a failure. Using the
xix
relations between the actions and the failure types decreases memory requirement
of the proposed method by eliminating unnecessary model updates during the plan
execution. The main contribution lies in representing each failure type hierarchically
in parallel and using the action-failure type relations.
xx
BI˙LI˙S¸SEL ROBOTLAR I˙ÇI˙N
EYLEM YÜRÜTME HATALARININ TANISI
ÖZET
Yapay Zeka konusundaki gelis¸meler ile birlikte günümüzdeki robot sistemleri daha
akıllı hale gelmis¸tir. Robot teknolojilerindeki son gelis¸meler ile de, robotların
gerçek dünya uygulamalarında kullanımları yaygınlas¸mıs¸tır. Günümüzde artık birçok
probleme robotlar aracılıg˘ı ile çes¸itli çözümler getirilmektedir.
Bilis¸sel bir robot, planlama, yürütme, yürütme gözlemleme ve hata tanısı görevlerini
yerine getirebilmelidir. Planlama, bir bas¸langıç durumundan istenen herhangi bir hedef
durumuna robotu ulas¸tıracak planın üretilmesidir. Yürütme, planlayıcı tarafından
üretilen sembolik plandaki eylemlerin yürütülmesi iken yürütme gözlemleme, planda
yer alan herhangi bir eylemin yürütülmesi sırasında ortaya çıkabilecek beklenmedik
hata durumlarının sezilmesi is¸idir. Hata tanısı ise, yürütme anında olus¸abilecek hata
durumlarının nedenlerine açıklama getirme is¸ine kars¸ılık gelir.
Gerçek dünyanın dinamik ve kısmi gözlemlenebilir yapısı nedeniyle, robotik
uygulamalarında yürütme hatalarının olus¸ması söz konusu olabilir. Bu hata
durumları, robot tarafından sezilmeli ve bu durumların nedenlerini belirlemek için
bir çıkarsama yordamı yürütülmelidir. Bu hataların sezilebilmesi için yürütme,
hem eylem hem de plan seviyesinde gözlemlenmelidir. Gürbüz eylem yürütme
için her ne kadar hata sezme önemli bir problem olsa da, olus¸an hatanın nedeni
de (hata tanısı) belirlenebilmelidir. Hata tanısı yapılabilmesi için de bir çıkarım
mekanizmasının yürütülmesi gerekmektedir. Bu çalıs¸mada, olasılıksal bir hata tanı
yöntemi önerilmektedir. Çalıs¸ma kapsamında, donanım/duyarga kısıtları, kısıtlı
bilgi veya çevresel dıs¸ etkenler nedeniyle olus¸abilecek eylem yürütme hataları ele
alınmaktadır.
Yürütme gözlemleme ve hata durumları hakkında çıkarım yapma bir veya daha fazla
duyargadan (görüntü, kuvvet, dokunma veya basınç) gelen bilgiyi yorumlamak ile
mümkün olabilmektedir. Bu nedenle, robotun hata sezme için ortamı yorumlaması
ve bir çıkarsama yordamı yürütmesi gerekir. Benzer bir yordam, robotun hata
tanısı yapabilmesi için de gereklidir. Dog˘ru bir hata tanısı yapabilmek için, robotun
ortamda olus¸abilecek hata modelleri hakkında bilgi sahibi olması gerekmektedir. Bazı
durumlarda, hatanın nedeni o anda yürütülmekte olan eylem ile dog˘rudan ilintili
olmayabilir. Hatanın nedeni, robot tarafından daha önce yürütülmüs¸ olan bir eylemin
istenmeyen bir sonucuna veya çevresel bir etkene ilis¸kin olabilir. Örneg˘in küp dünyası
domeninde, alt blok düzgün bir s¸ekilde yerles¸tirilmemis¸ ise, hali hazırda dizilmis¸ olan
kulenin üzerine yeni bir blok konması is¸lemi sırasında bütün yapı yıkılabilir. Bu
tür hata durumlarının tanısını koyabilmek için zamansal çıkarım yapılması gerekir.
Dahası, bir hatanın birden fazla nedeni olabilir. Bu gibi durumlarda hatanın nedenini
belirleyebilmek için olasılıksal ve zamansal bir modele ihtiyaç duyulmaktadır.
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Bu çalıs¸mada, hata durumlarının nedenlerini belirleyebilmek için Hiyerars¸ik Saklı
Markov Modellerine (HSMM) dayalı bir hata tanı yöntemi önerilmektedir. Önerilen
yöntem, paralel olarak is¸lenen ve farklı tipte hata durumlarını temsil eden
HSMM’lerini içermektedir. Herbir hata tipi, ayrı bir SMM (Saklı Markov Modeli)
ile hiyerars¸ik bir yapıda modellenmis¸tir. HSMM’lere dayalı olan model, durumların
zamansal boyutta analizinin yapılmasına olanak vermekte ve beklenen durumlardan
bir sapma gerçekles¸tig˘inde zamansal hata bilgisinin durumlar arasında yayılmasını
sag˘lamaktadır. Birden çok hipoteze göre hata durumunun olasılıksal olarak tanısını
yapabilmek için farklı durumların aynı anda takip edilmesi gerekir. Bu çalıs¸manın ana
katkısı, her bir hata tipinin eylem-hata tipi ilis¸kilerini de kullanarak ayrı bir hiyerars¸ik
SMM olarak temsil edilmesidir. Bu temsil, bir nesne veya çevresel olay üzerine kalıcı
olan hata durumları da dahil olmak üzere birçok hata durumunun tanısını mümkün
kılmaktadır.
Bu çalıs¸mada incelenen eylem yürütme hataları s¸unlardır: Bütün nesneler için
Görüntü is¸leme, Konumlama, Donanım kısıtları (eyleyici/efektör) ve bütün nesneler
için Dıs¸ olay hatalarıdır. Görüntü(nesne) hata modeli, görüntü is¸leme algoritmasının
belirli bir nesneyi dog˘ru olarak tanıyamadıg˘ı durumu temsil eder. Donanım kısıtları
(eyleyici/efektör) hata tipi, robotun fiziksel kapasitesi dıs¸ındaki durumları temsil eder.
Dıs¸ olay(nesne) hata tipi ise robotun kontrolü dıs¸ında, dıs¸ dünyada olus¸an deg˘is¸iklikler
nedeniyle olus¸an hataları temsil eder. Konumlama hata tipi robotun ortamda konumunu
belirleyemedig˘i durumları temsil eder.
Önerilen sistem, planlayıcı tarafından üretilen ve eylem dizisi içeren sembolik planı ve
ayrı ayrı paralel olarak temsil edilen hata tipi modellerini girdi olarak kabul etmektedir.
Sistemin çıktısı ise, hata durumunun nedeninden sorumlu olan olası hata modelleri
listesidir. Robot planında yer alan bir eylem üç durumda olabilir: bas¸arı, hata ve
yürütmede. bas¸arı durumu robotun bir eylemi beklenen sonuçları ile sonlandırdıg˘ını,
hata durumu eylemin beklenmedik etkilerle sonlandıg˘ını ve yürütmede ise robotun
eylemi yürütmeyi henüz bitirmedig˘ini temsil eder. Her eylemin yürütülmesi sırasında,
Hiyerars¸ik SMM’lerin alt katmanında o eyleme kars¸ı düs¸en modeller daha önce
tanımlanmıs¸ olan eylem-hata tipi ilis¸kileri göz önüne alınarak güncellenir. Eg˘er hata
tipi modeli ve eylem ilgili ise model güncellenir, deg˘il ise o eylem süresince ilgili
hata modeli pasif kalır. Yürütme as¸amasında robotun duyargaları aracılıg˘ı ile alınan
gözlemler, duyargaların istatistiksel analizine bag˘lı olan bir olasılık dag˘ılımına kars¸ılık
düs¸ürülür ve bu deg˘ere göre yeni durum olus¸turulur.
I˙lgili eylemin yürütülmesi sona erince, alt katman modelinde Viterbi algoritması
yürütülür ve alt katmandaki durumlardan hata nedeni olma olasılıg˘ı en yüksek olan
durumun deg˘eri üst katmana aktarılır. Üst katmandaki model, yürütülen eylem ile
ilgili ise güncellenir. Aksi takdirde model pasif olarak is¸aretlenir ve ilgili modelin
s¸imdiki zaman düg˘ümü yaratılmadan bir önceki durumun zaman vektörü genis¸letilir.
Bu durum, robot planındaki bütün eylemleri bas¸arılı bir s¸ekilde yürütünceye veya
hata durumu ile kars¸ılas¸ıncaya kadar devam eder. Hataların, gözlemlemeye dayalı
bir yöntem ile sezildig˘i varsayılmaktadır. Hata durumu olus¸tug˘unda, üst katman
modellerinde Viterbi Algoritması yürütülerek hataya neden olabilecek modeller
belirlenir. Bunun için, modellerdeki durumlar incelenir ve hata ile is¸aretlenmis¸
durumlar saptanarak olasılıklarına bakılır. Bu olasılıklardan belli bir es¸ik deg˘erinin
üzerinde olan modeller aday listesine eklenir. Çalıs¸ma sonunda bu liste olası hata
nedenleri olarak döndürülür.
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Yöntemin bas¸arım analizi Pioneer 3-AT gezgin robotu ile farklı tipte hatalar içeren
senaryolar üzerinde yapılmıs¸tır. Elde edilen sonuçlar, gelis¸tirilen yöntemin hataların
birden fazla nedene bag˘lı oldug˘u durumlarda da olasılıksal olarak belirlenebileceg˘ini
göstermektedir. Ayrıca, hata tipleri ve eylemler arasındaki ilis¸kilerin kullanılması da
durum uzayını daraltarak, yöntemin bellek gereksinimini azaltmaktadır.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Robot technologies have shown great progress in recent years. Such advances make
robot systems applicable to many domains. Therefore, many hardware systems and
algorithms have been proposed for the robots. However, due to the complex nature of
the robotic environments, failures may occur during the execution of robotic missions.
An autonomous robot may face several failure situations during the execution of its
actions to achieve a goal [4] due to non-deterministic actions or different sources of
uncertainty in physical dynamic environments. A monitoring system is pivotal in order
to achieve goals robustly in the face of uncertainties. While detecting failures is one
of the central problems for robust execution [5–7], the robot should also identify the
reasons of the failure for efficient recovery. Isolation of a failure requires an inference
process to find the underlying reason behind the failure. In this research, the main
focus is on a probabilistic failure isolation method. We address action execution
failures that may arise due to hardware/sensor limitations, limited knowledge on some
environmental features [8] or external events.
Monitoring and reasoning about failures requires interpreting data from one or more
sensors (e.g., vision, force, touch, pressure). Therefore, in order to detect a failure, the
robot needs to interpret the scene and apply certain reasoning tools to come up with
correct conclusions. To achieve complete isolation of the failure, the robot needs to
maintain a priori information on the models of failures that are likely to occur in the
environment. In some cases, the reason of a failure may not be directly related to the
action that is being executed. The reason of the failure may be depending on a previous
action that is executed by the robot or an external event. For example, in the blocks
world domain, when the base block structure is not properly formed, the execution of a
stack action on the existing tower may fail, and the whole structure may be completely
destroyed. In order to isolate these types of failures, a temporal reasoning model is
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needed. Furthermore, there may be more than one cause of a failure. To deal with such
cases, a probabilistic temporal model is useful to identify the possible failure cases.
1.1 Purpose of Thesis
In this thesis, the main goal is to isolate the causes of the action execution failures for
robust execution. For efficient recovery, causes of action execution failures should be
indicated by the robot. Otherwise, the robot may not be able to reach its desired goal
state. Therefore, an inference mechanism should be applied in order to isolate possible
action execution failures.
1.2 Hypothesis
In this thesis, a Hidden Markov Model (HMM) based isolation method is proposed
to determine causes of the failures. The method includes parallel Hierarchical HMMs
(HHMMs) running for tracking modelled failure types. The HMM model provides
temporal analysis of states and propagates temporal failure information over time
after a deviation occurs. Multiple hypotheses are tracked at the same time to identify
underlying causes in a probabilistic manner. The main contribution lies in modelling
each failure type as a distinct HHMM running in parallel considering action-failure
type relations in a robotic planning domain. Several failure types are modelled and
isolation of these failures is done in a probabilistic isolation framework. Failure
situations are investigated in real robot scenarios. Furthermore, using the relations
between the failure types and the actions decreases the number of generated states
during the execution.
2
2. BACKGROUND
Failure detection and isolation (diagnosis) is an intensively investigated issue for robot
systems due to the need for safe plan execution. In this section, literature review on the
failure detection/diagnosis is presented. First, failure detection methods are examined.
Afterwards, failure diagnosis methods are presented.
2.1 Failure Detection
Failure detection is applied to intuit the inconsistencies during the execution. In [5],
sources of uncertainty classified under four categories, namely, missing information,
unreliable sources, stochastic phenomena and inherently vague concepts. After
this categorization, execution monitoring methods in robotics are presented under
three categories: analytical approaches, data-driven approaches and knowledge-based
approaches. Monitoring can take place both in plan level and action level. A common
approach to detect failures is using an observer-based approach [5]. In this approach,
predefined models and inconsistencies between the expected and observed outcomes
are used to detect failures.
A comprehensive survey in execution monitoring is presented in [9]. Monitoring is
surveyed in terms of external monitoring, expectation-based monitoring and model
based monitoring (Diagnosis and state evaluation).
2.2 Failure Diagnosis
Failure diagnosis is applied in order to find the reasons behind the failures. In a
knowledge-based data driven fault diagnosis approach [10], failures are diagnosed
using Fuzzy Logic in three steps: acquiring information, making inferences and taking
actions. In the first phase, process trend analysis is used to extract information from
the real data. A system that makes fuzzy inference is given in the second step. In that
step, if-then rules that are gathered from the experts are used. After making inferences,
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some actions to return the system to its normal conditions are done in the third step.
However, the performance of the method is highly dependent on the quality of expert
knowledge.
Failure causes are listed in three headings in [11]. First, an action fails to produce
its desired effect. Second, the world evolves different from it is modelled. Last,
an exogenous event happens. However, autonomous robots may also fail because
of errors in sensing, interpretation of sensor data and action execution. Monitoring
and reasoning are achieved to detect and cope with failures. The idea of this paper is
to detect inconsistencies between the theory and the model of the real world, plan
execution and actual observations. Experiments are done on a delivery robot. It
delivers letter, calculator and folder to their final destinations. From representation
of states, logical inferences are made due to the failures. For example, if the robot
detects an object and believes that it belongs to another room, it first tries to grasp it to
verify if it really exists or not. If the robot can successfully grasp the object, it updates
its belief.
Uncertainties may arise over the reasons of failures. This is handled with
semantic-knowledge based execution monitoring where the robot estimates a
probability distribution according to its expectations [12]. Structural abstraction is
used for model-based diagnosis in earlier works [13, 14].
Model-based failure diagnosis in technical processes has been investigated by many
researchers previously [15]. Dynamic Bayesian Networks (DBN) and Particle Filters
are used for failure diagnosis [16]. In this work, a two-phased approach is used for
failure diagnosis. DBNs are used to find the most possible candidate electric machines
that failed. DBNs are learned off-line from raw data. After selecting the most possible
candidate electric machines, Particle Filters (PFs) are used to track potential failed
machine. Furthermore, a number of complementary algorithms are presented in [17].
These algorithms are for improving the accuracy of Fault Detection and Identification
(FDI) with a Particle Filter.
In another work, a hierarchical representation with Particle Filters is used for failure
diagnosis [18] to handle faults. A tree structure is used to represent faults where leaf
nodes are faults and internal nodes are intermediate nodes that aggregate similar fault
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nodes. Due to the hierarchical representation in modelling faults, only single faults
are identified. In the same work, Partially Observable Markov Decision Processes
(POMDPs) are also proposed for failure diagnosis in indoor mobile robot navigation.
The policy for POMDP is gathered off-line.
Extended action models are also proposed in a control loop that integrates monitoring,
diagnosis and recovery [19]. Actions of a robot are represented with their conditions
both in time t and t + 1. Furthermore, degraded versions of these situations are also
defined in the extended action model. These models are used to detect failures. After
detection of a failure, the robot diagnoses the failure by replanning from current
situation to R where R is the repaired status. This status is defined with three
conditions: (1) all the functionalities in faulty situation is fixed, (2) preconditions of
the next action is satisfied (3) for the further actions, no open preconditions are left. If
an empty plan returns, the robot plans to another safe situation S in order not to effect
other robots in the environment.
Meta-cognitive loop (MCL) is a method to detect failures and respond them [20].
Process of dealing with a failure consists of three steps. First, the agent notes an
anomaly. After noting the anomaly, it tries to assess it. Indications are represented
in a graph structure. Failure ontology is also represented in a graph structure which is
connected to indication event nodes via inter-ontological links called diagnostic nodes.
These inter-ontological links allow meta-cognitive loop to move into guide state. In
this state potential responses are found and after calculating their utilities, one of them
is chosen and implemented. If a failure occurs again, then the response found before
is marked and indications are updated with the new failure.
A history-based belief management framework is proposed in [21]. IndiGolog is used
as agent programming language. This framework is used to detect and handle failures
that may be encountered during execution. Failures that happen during picking up
an object, picking up a wrong object and sensing failures are recovered. A delivery
robot simulation in an office is used for experimental setup. The robot has a tactile
sensor for deciding if it is carrying an object or not and a vision sensor which registers
objects in a room. Hypotheses are used to overcome failures. Using history based
diagnosis, action sequences which are suitable with the current situation are generated.
Situation calculus is used to encode every activity and change is encoded as actions.
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Proposed method includes four main steps: updating hypotheses, checking consistency
of favourite hypotheses, diagnosis of hypotheses and deciding on new hypotheses.
In [22], logic programming with situation calculus [23] is studied in order to explain
the unexpected deviations in task execution using hypotheses and their costs. Situation
calculus is used to reason about an actions and their effects. External events, wrong
knowledge and sensor failures are handled. A hypothesis pool is used in order to
explain such situations. During the execution, each hypothesis is updated considering
the actual sensor result and relations among fluent values. In case of inconsistencies,
the actual hypothesis is removed from the pool and explaining diagnoses are generated.
Pool has a maximum hypothesis capacity. A cost value is defined for each hypothesis.
The cost is calculated by using the additional cost of insertions and variations on the
new hypothesis plus the original cost of the original hypothesis. Finally, a hypothesis
with the lower cost is selected to be processed again until inconsistencies do not exist
on it.
Robots can learn new actions and their preconditions and effects from natural language
instructions [24]. After learning new actions, robot updates its knowledge base and
replans. As an example, a room with a locked door and a robot in it is given. The goal
for the robot is to be in the outside of the room but the robot does not know pushing the
door one meter has an effect of opening the door. An architecture namely DIARC is
proposed and this framework has such components namely speech recognizer, vision
processor, laser processor, goal manager, SapaReplan planner and motion planner.
Such a statement “If you are at a closed door and you push it one meter, you will be
in the room.” causes the robot to parse the sentence and create a new action to open a
door. The robot adds this action to its domain definition and when it faces a door again,
it executes the new learned action. First Order Logic is used to represent knowledge.
SapaReplan planner is an extended version of Sapa planner and it can make plans with
considering costs, durations and partial satisfaction of goals.
In another work, situations where a planner-based agent is not able to find a plan to
achieve a goal state is investigated [25]. Causal graphs and domain transition graphs
are used to analyse the relations between fluent symbols. Excuses (causes of why a
planner can not find a plan) are classified under three categories: acceptable excuses,
good excuses and perfect excuses. Acceptable excuses are defined with having less
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initial facts in the explanation. When two acceptable excuses are given, one of them
is said to be good if it subsumes the other. An excuse is said to be perfect if its cost
is minimal. The cost defines the change rate in the initial state to explain the absence
of the plan. A* search is used with two different heuristics. One of them is LM Cut
heuristic and the other one is enhanced-additive heuristic. The proposed method can
introduce excuses in such situations where the planner is not able to find a plan.
2.2.1 HMM-based diagnosis methods
In some model-based fault detection and isolation systems, HMMs are used to monitor
processes [26]. Force/torque signals are used to feedback the proposed models. Models
are trained with Baum-Welch algorithm to estimate the parameters.
HMMs are also previously proposed to diagnose failures in different domains.
Accidents in nuclear power plants are diagnosed using HMMs [27]. In this work,
Baum-Welch algorithm is used to re-estimate the parameters of the model. Eight
accident types and a normal state are represented as a single HMM and accidents are
identified calculating the probability of each model after gathering observations.
In another work [28], HMMs are used to diagnose systems with partial and imperfect
tests. A fault dictionary matrix is provided to associate faults and tests. If a test can
detect a failure, the relation is established in the matrix. HMM with known parameters,
adaptive HMM (parameters of the HMM is learned with Baum-Welch algorithm) and
a hamming distance based diagnosis method is compared.
A bearing fault detection and isolation system is proposed in [29]. Vibration signals
are used and using a polynomial transfer function, features are extracted. Failures are
detected with pre-trained HMM for the normal case. Diagnosis is made by the HMM
that has the maximum probability. Method is evaluated on the data derived from drive
and ball bearing of an induction motor.
HMMs are used in a mobile robot system to estimate the most appropriate mode for
the robot in execution [30]. Three modes are defined: plan, stop and react. In the plan
mode, the robot plans a path from its current position to a location. It uses a motion
planning algorithm. Modality react is used to avoid obstacles in the environment using
the laser range finder data. Mode stop corresponds to the modality where the robot
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stops. During the execution of a task, the robot uses the a priori information and
monitoring to select and switch among the modalities.
HMMs are also used in fault diagnosis of metal stamping processes [31]. Feature
extraction is done by using autoregressive model (AR). After extraction of the features,
HMMs are used for classification.
Continuous HMMs (CHMMs) are employed for diagnosing mechanical fault signals
[32]. CHMMs are HMMs of a vector sequence. Baum-Welch algorithm is used to
train HMMs. Monitoring signals are gathered and feature vector sequence is extracted.
After this phase, log-likelihood of each model is calculated and the model which has
the maximum probability is selected. A rotor simulator is used in the experiments and
rotor fault signals are gathered.
In another work [33], fast Fourier transform (FFT), autoregressive (AR) time series,
wavelet transform and bi-spectrum are used as feature extraction methods. Then,
feature vectors are used the train HMMs with Baum-Welch algorithm. After training
phase, fault type decision is made considering calculated probabilities.
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3. HIDDEN MARKOV MODELS
In this chapter, Hidden Markov Models (HMMs) and Hierarchical Hidden Markov
Models (HHMMs) are explained.
3.1 Hidden Markov Models (HMMs)
In this section, first Markov Processes are explained. Afterwards, Hidden Markov
Models (HMMs) are examined [1].
3.1.1 Markov processes
In a Markov Process a system can be in N distinct states. At a given time t, the system
can be in one of the states: S1, S2, S3,...,SN . At each time step t, the system may change
its state with a probability. The state at time t is also denoted with qt . This definition
forms a general Markov Process. The system moves into a new step by considering
previous states.
In Markov Processes, the current state of the system (qt) is defined as a function of
the history of the system. Depending on the number of past states considered, the
order of Markov processes are determined accordingly. For example, if the state of
the system only depends on the intermediate previous state, it is called a first-order
Markov Process (Equation 3.1).
P(qt = S j|qt−1 = Si,qt−2 = Sk...) = P(qt = S j|qt−1 = Si) (3.1)
Similarly, a second-order Markov Process would be defined for a system that considers
the last two previous states in order to define the current state (Equation 3.2).
P(qt = S j|qt−1 = Si,qt−2 = Sk...) = P(qt = S j|qt−1 = Si,qt−2 = Sk) (3.2)
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It is also assumed that transition between any two state is independent of time
(Equation 3.3). An example three state Markov model is shown in Figure 3.1. In
the figure, each circle represents a single state. The system can be in one of these
states at any time step. pii represents the probability of the situation where the system
is in state i initially. ai j defines the probability of transferring from state i to state j.
ai j = P(qt = S j|qt−1 = Si)s.t.

ai j ≥ 0
N
∑
j=1
ai j = 1
(3.3)
Figure 3.1: A three state Markov model [1].
3.1.2 Hidden Markov Models (HMMs)
Hidden Markov Models (HMMs) [34] are probabilistic temporal structures that include
hidden states. The underlying model of the HMMs are Markov processes. The
next step of the system is defined only considering the current state of the system.
Therefore, Markov property holds for Hidden Markov Models (HMMs).
An HMM consists of five components, namely states, observations, transition
probabilities, observation probabilities and the initial state distribution.
• There are N hidden states in an HMM. Each hidden state is denoted with Si ∈ S
where S is the set of hidden states.
• Transition model, A = ai j, defines the probability of transferring from state Si to
state S j where Si, S j ∈ S.
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• Observations, denoted by the Ot , represent the sensory information gathered at time
t.
• Observation model, denoted by B = bSi(Ot), defines the probability of gathering the
observation Ot at state Si.
• Initial state probability distribution is represented with pi = pii. This distribution
defines the probability P(q1 = Si).
Given the components above, an HMM is represented with a tuple; λ= (A,B,pi). The
model can be used to generate arbitrary number of observation sequences given λ .
Figure 3.2: An example HMM unfolded in time. The HMM structure builds a lattice
showing all possible hidden state sequences [1].
An example HMM is shown in Figure 3.2. In this figure, each column represents a
time step and each node is a hidden state. Once an observation is gathered, the system
passes another state. All possible hidden state sequences are shown in Figure 3.2.
3.1.2.1 Basic problems of HMMs
There are three basic problems of HMMs given a number of sequence of observations.
• Calculating the likelihood of a given observation sequence, O = { O1, O2 ... Ot },
P(O|λ ). The problem is called the Evaluation Problem.
• Finding the most likely state sequence of a given observation sequence, O = { O1,
O2 ... Ot }, given λ , P(Q|O,λ ). The problem is called the Finding State Sequence.
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• Given a training set of observation sequences X = {Ok}k, learning the model
parameters λ ∗ with maximizing P(X |λ ). This problem is called Learning Model
Parameters.
Considering an observation sequence, O = { O1, O2 ... Ot }, and a state sequence, Q =
{ S1, S2 ... St }, probability of observing the given observation sequence is defined as
follows:
P(O|λ ,Q) =
T
∏
t=1
P(Ot |St ,λ ) = bS1(O1).bS2(O2).bS2(O2) (3.4)
However, this production can not be calculated since the state sequence is unknown.
The probability of the state sequence is defined as:
P(Q|λ ) = P(S1)
T
∏
t=2
P(St |St−1) = piS1.aS1S2...aSt−1St (3.5)
Then the joint probability is:
P(O,Q|λ )=P(S1)
T
∏
t=2
P(St |St−1)
T
∏
t=1
P(Ot |St)= piS1.bS1(O1).aS1S2.bS2(O2)...bSt (Ot).aSt−1St
(3.6)
P(O|λ ) can be calculated by summing up over all possible Q:
P(O|λ ) = ∑
all possibleS
P(O,Q|λ ) (3.7)
However, there are NT possible states in Q where Q is the possible state sequences.
Therefore, it is not efficient to calculate all these possible states. In order to
calculate P(O|λ ), forward-backward procedure is proposed. The observation sequence
is divided into two parts. A forward variable (αt(i)) is defined to represent the
probability of observing the observation sequence until time t and being at hidden
state Si. Similarly, a backward variable (βt(i)) is defined to represent the probability of
observing the observation sequence from time t +1 to T . These probability values can
be calculated recursively (Figure 3.3).
Forward variable is calculated as follows:
12
Figure 3.3: Forward-backward procedure [1].
• Initialization
α1(i) = piibi(O1) (3.8)
• Recursion
αt+1( j) = P(O1...Ot+1,qt+1 = S j|λ ) (3.9)
Backward variable is calculated as follows:
• Initialization
βT (i) = 1 (3.10)
• Recursion
βt(i) =∑
j
P(Ot+1|qt+1 = S j,λ ) (3.11)
Finding the state sequence problem is solved by using the Viterbi algorithm [35] which
is based on dynamic programming. The algorithm finds a single state sequence. The
algorithm recursively finds the optimal state sequence with backtracking at time T by
choosing the most probable state at each time step.
In order to find the most probable states, δt(i) is defined to represent the path with the
highest probability at time t that is calculated for the first t observations. The last state
of this path is Si. After calculating these probabilities, the most probable path can be
found by backtracking from the last time step T . ψt( j) is defined to represent the state
index i that maximizes the multiplication of the previous step’s δt−1(i) and ai j.
Viterbi algorithm consists of three steps. The steps are given as follows:
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• Initialization
δ1(i) = piibi(O1) (3.12)
ψi(i) = 0 (3.13)
• Recursion
δt( j) = maxiδt−1(i)ai j.b j(Ot) (3.14)
ψt( j) = argmaxiδt−1(i)ai j (3.15)
• Termination
p∗ = maxiδT (i) (3.16)
q∗t = argmaxiδT (i) (3.17)
Learning the model parameters problem is solved with Baum-Welch algorithm which
is an EM algorithm. However, this is out of scope in this thesis.
3.2 Hierarchical Hidden Markov Models (HHMMs)
Hierarchical HMMs are proposed to represent each hidden state as a probabilistic
method on its own [2]. The primary motivation of this structure is to model natural
hierarchical structures better. Therefore, the HHMMs allow representing models in a
hierarchical way. Furthermore, the models allow arbitrary number of activations in the
sub-models.
In an HHMM, each hidden state has its own probabilistic model. Therefore, each
state is another HHMM on its own. Beacuse of this property, states in an HHMM
emit sequences instead of a single observation symbol. Once a state is activated
in an HHMM, its probabilistic model is activated and transitions occur inside that
sub-HMM. These transitions are called horizontal transitions. Recursively, a state in
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that sub-model may also activate its sub-model. This is called a vertical transition. In
a sub-model, when a special state is reached, control of the model passes to the upper
level model. This special state is called production state. Hidden states that do not
emit observations directly are called inner states.
A four level HHMM is given in Figure 3.4. Gray and black edges represent vertical
and transitions. Dashed edges show the return of the control of the models to the upper
level model. It is also assumed that all states can be reached by a finite number of
states from the root state. This makes the model strongly connected. Note that it is
also possible to represent an HHMM as a plain HMM. However, hierarchical structure
would be absent in that representation.
Figure 3.4: A four-level HHMM [2].
In this thesis, a similar idea of representing HMMs in a hierarchical way is adopted
to the problem of failure isolation. Different failure types are modelled with hierarchy
levels to isolate failures in a robotic planning domain. This representation will be
explained in detail in the next section.
15
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4. PROBABILISTIC FAILURE ISOLATION
In this chapter, a taxonomy of robot failures is presented. Afterwards, the proposed
method for the failure isolation problem is explained.
4.1 A Taxonomy of Robot Failures in Cognitive Tasks
A taxonomy of robot failures in cognitive tasks [4] is given in Figure 4.1. The
taxonomy presents two main categories, namely, external and internal failures.
External failures are related to environmental issues whereas internal failures are more
about the robot’s internal state. Internal failures are divided into two subcategories
as hardware and software failures. Hardware issues are about component failures of
the robot. This branch includes five sub-branches: (1) Actuator/ effector failures (2)
Sensor failures (3) Power supply failures (4) Lack of hardware resources. The actuators
or the effectors of the robot may fail due to mechanical or electrical issues. Sensor
failures may represent a state where sensory information is partially or completely
lost. A robot may also fail to perform any tasks due to its dead battery. When the
robot lacks the required hardware resources to execute an action, it may fail to achieve
it. Assume that the robot is assigned a pick up action. If the object is too heavy for
the robot to lift, the robot may fail to achieve this task. The other branch of internal
failures -software failures- include three main categories, namely, localization, sensor
and general failures. Localization failures are about errors in localization. While sensor
failures are about incomplete sensor model, general failures are about other failures
which occur due to the other software issues of the robot.
The second main category of failures includes external failures. A similar classification
for external failures is given in an earlier work [36]. The taxonomy presents five
sub-branches for external failures: (1) Communication failures (2) Misbeliefs on
the facts and the rules in the KB (3) Lack of knowledge (4) Conflicting goals (5)
Impossible goals.
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Communication failures occur when the robot is not able to communicate with other
robots or with an operation center in the environment. The same instance may occur
when robots collaborate with each other through communication. The robot may
also have misbeliefs in its KB of the pre/post conditions of actions or events. That
may result in failures in achieving tasks. Action-related failures may occur due to
incomplete representation of actions in the KB. For instance, actions may lead to
unexpected outcomes in the environment. Similarly, the robot may not be aware
of some events and their effects in the environment. Object-related failures arise
from false beliefs about an object’s existence, location or its attributes. These types
of failures may arise from visual features (e.g., SIFT, VPFH etc.) as well as the
mobility-related features such as weight, grasp position and center of mass (COM).
For example, when the robot tries to pick up an object, it may detect that the object
is wider than the size of its gripper. However, if the robot detects that the object has
a handler, it may recover from the failure by grasping it from its handler. Misbeliefs
about other robots may cause timing problems and this leads to failures especially in
cooperation. In such a case, when the other robot delays or somehow fails, the robot
may probably fail. The robot may also fail if it has misbeliefs about humans in the
environment. When a domestic service robot has erroneous preference model for its
companion, the robot may fail in achieving the desired goal. Lack of knowledge about
objects, actions and events may also result in failures. Robots may also fail in achieving
their tasks when their goals conflict with each other. Finally, when the robot detects
that its goal is impossible to achieve, there is no way to attain the given objective. For
instance, if the goal of the robot is going outside of a room without a door, the robot
will not be able to reach its goal under this circumstance.
Note that failures in path planning are not presented in this taxonomy since failures in
higher level cognitive tasks are addressed. Although there seems that failure types are
distinct from each other, simultaneous failure causes or chain of events may result in
failures.
These failure modes can also be classified under two main categories: complete and
partial failures. Complete failures model the situations where the robot is not able to
execute any actions. Assume that the software system of the robot completely crashes.
In this case, the robot may not even be able to find out the reason of the failure. On the
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other hand, whenever a partial failure occur (e.g., a sensor failure) the robot may find
a way to handle the failure.
In this thesis, vision failures, localization failures, misbeliefs about external events
and actuator/effector failures are handled. In the next section, representation of these
failure types within a model based system is presented.
4.2 HHMM-based Failure Isolation
In the proposed method [37, 38], the type of a failure that may occur during the
execution of an action is modelled as a distinct HHMM. In this representation,
two-level HMMs are employed where parent states -top level HMMs- correspond to
actions in a given plan. Lower level HMMs corresponds to execution states of an action
(Figure 4.2). Each model is denoted by Mi where i is the index of the corresponding
failure type. Causes of failures that are addressed in this thesis are: vision failures for
all objects, localization failures, hardware limitations (gripper) and external events
for all objects. Vision(X) failure model for a specific object(X) represents a faulty
situation in the vision algorithm for that object (i.e., error on detection the object itself
or its relations). Model HardwareLimitation indicates the situations that are beyond
the capabilities of the robot. ExternalEvent stands for external events that change the
world outside the control of the robot. Localization failures model the faulty situations
where the robot cannot localize itself. Depending on the action that is being executed
at a given world state and its parameters, the related failure models are activated. In
both levels, each state has a latent variable which is either success or failure. Therefore,
there are two hidden states in that representation. During the execution of an action
in the plan, a lower level HMM is activated under the action state, and its model is
updated. When the execution of an action ends, this lower level HMM is used to return
a result to the upper level of the corresponding HHMM. The problem is to find models
that include latent variables with the value failure and have failure probabilities over a
given threshold. A generic illustration for the proposed method is given in Figure 4.2.
Hierarchical HMMs are used to represent failure models instead of classical HMMs
because a hierarchy between the plan, its actions and its execution states is needed in
order to isolate persistent failures on a specific object or event. For instance, the robot’s
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            ws2             ws3            ws1
Mi
Plan
action3action1 action2
 S1  Sk  St...
Failure Model (i) Failure Model (i)
...
 y1  yk  yt
 S1  Sk  St......
 y1  yk  yt
 S1  Sk  St...
Failure Model (i)
...
 y1  yk  yt
Figure 4.2: An illustration of an HHMM failure model corresponding to the actions of
a given plan.
vision system may fail to recognize a specific object in the environment all the time.
In such cases, faulty model can be easily separated from the rest of the models.
The relations that define which action is related to which failure type are given in
Table 4.1 for a specific object(objX) called object A. Using the relations listed in Table
4.1, only related models are updated during the execution of an action. Therefore,
irrelevant failure models are not updated during the execution of an action. For
example, according to the table, during the execution put-down(objA), only the gripper
failure model is activated where other models become passive.
Table 4.1: Action-Failure type relations used in the model.
Action Failure Type
move-to-obj(objX)
Vision(objX), ExternalEvent(objX)
Localization(Robot)
move-to-loc(destination) Localization(Robot)
pick-up(objX)
ExternalEvent(objX), Gripper(Robot)
Vision(objX), Localization(Robot)
put-down(objX) Gripper(Robot)
At the very beginning of the execution of the plan, the first state for each failure type
is activated considering observations in the initial state. During the execution of each
action, if that action and a failure type are related, the corresponding failure type’s
HHMM is activated for that time step, and this model is considered as an active model.
Perceptions are gathered from the sensors of the robot (e.g., pressure sensor, RGB-D
sensor, etc.) and these observations are mapped into a probability distribution which
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depends on the statistical analysis of the sensory input. Depending on the observations
gathered at the current state, the new state’s contents are calculated considering the
previous state with the following equations where vt is the Viterbi value which is
calculated for each time step t, and δt is the state index that maximizes the given
statement.
vt(Si) = maxk(vt−1(k)∗a(k,Si))∗bSi(Ot) (4.1)
δt(Si) = argmaxk(vt−1(k)∗a(k,Si)) (4.2)
If a failure model is not related to the action in execution, it is considered as a passive
model, and the last state of the corresponding HHMM’s time interval is augmented in
such a way that the corresponding state also includes that time step without generating
a new state. This procedure goes on until the robot reaches the goal state or a failure
is detected. In case of a failure, the Viterbi algorithm [35] is invoked to label latent
variables with either success or failure in each HHMM.
Algorithm 1 FailureIsolation(P,M)
1: Input: Plan P, failure models M, Action-Failure type relations R
2: Output: list, the list of the candidate causes of a failure
3: while P != /0 and status == success do
4: action = POP(P)
5: activeModels = extractActionFailureRelations(action,R)
6: while (status = execute(action)) == inExecution do
7: predicateList = observeT heScene()
8: probabilityList = calculateObservationProbabilities(predicateList,activeModels)
9: updateLowerLevelModels(M,activeModels, probabilityList)
10: end while
11: labelLowerLevelLatents(M, t)
12: transitToU pperLevel(M, t)
13: updateModels(M,activeModels) // Algorithm 2
14: end while
15: for all Mi do
16: labelU pperLevelLatents(Mi)
17: end for
18: list = isolateModels(M) // Algorithm 3
19: return list
Algorithms 1-3 are presented to summarize the proposed failure isolation approach.
Algorithm 1 accepts a plan, failure models and action-failure type relations as
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parameters. Plan P includes a sequence of actions to be executed by the robot.
An action can be in one of the following states: inExecution, success and failure.
inExecution corresponds to the state in which the robot executes an action. success
stands for the state that the robot reached the expected outcomes of a corresponding
action. failure corresponds to the situations where the expected outcomes of an action
are not met.
Algorithm 2 updateModels(M,activeModels)
1: Input: Failure models M, extracted related failure models activeModels
2: Output: Mi is updated according to observations
3: for all Mi do
4: if isRelated(Mi,activeModels) then
5: addNewState(Mi)
6: else
7: extendPreviousState(Mi)
8: end if
9: end for
First, an action is popped from the plan which is generated by the planner.
According to the action and its parameters, predefined action-failure type relations
are used to extract active models from the failure model set. Other failure
models that are irrelevant with the action to be executed, are labelled as passive
model. With executing extractActionFailureRelations(action,R) action, active and
passive models are defined. Once the execution of the action is started, the
robot observes the world state through its sensors and related predicates are
extracted with the observeTheScene() method. Using calculateObservationProb-
abilities(predicateList,activeModels) procedure, this world state is mapped into a
probability distribution in the Conditional Probability Tables (CPTs). After calculating
all probabilities for active models, all related failure models’ lower levels are updated
with updateLowerLevelModels(M,activeModels,probabilityList). Note that passive
models are not updated since they are eliminated from the current action’s time
interval. When the action comes to an end, Viterbi algorithm [35] is invoked in
the lower level updated models with the labelLowerLevelLatents(M,t) procedure.
By running the Viterbi algorithm, each HHMM’s lower levels’ hidden states for
that executed action are labelled with success or failure. A transition to the
upper level occurs with the transitToUpperLevel(M,t) function by using calculated
maximum failure probability in the related model’s lower level for the corresponding
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action’s time interval. That maximum value is passed to the upper level with
transitToUpperLevel(M,t) model. At the end of the Algorithm 1, a list that contains the
possible causes of the failure with a probability exceeding a given threshold is returned
with isolateModels(M). The content of this procedure is explained in Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 2 explains the update procedure of upper level models. In Algorithm 1,
active models are extracted considering predefined action-failure type relations, and
this list is used as a parameter of Algorithm 2. For all active models, a new state is
generated considering Equations 4.2-4.1, and the context of the newly generated state
are updated. Otherwise, if a failure model Mi is not in the active model list, the previous
state’s time interval is extended without generating a new state.
Algorithm 3 isolateModels(M)
1: Input: M, Failure models
2: Output: list, the list of the candidate causes of a failure
3: list = /0
4: for all Mi do
5: for all ws j do
6: if Mi.getHiddenState(ws j) == f ailure and Mi.getProbability(ws j) ≥
threshold then
7: list.add(Mi)
8: break
9: end if
10: end for
11: end for
12: return list
Algorithm 3 returns a list that contains candidate causes of a failure. In order to find
this list, all the models are examined, and probability and latent variable values are
considered. If a state is labelled with failure and its normalized probability value is over
a given threshold, this model is added to the cause list. The threshold is predefined as
0.5 since there are two hidden states in the models. Otherwise, the model is not added
to the cause list. At the end of the Algorithm 3, the list is returned to the Algorithm 1.
4.2.1 Model parameters
In this section, parameters for the HMMs are presented for the proposed method.
First, world state definition (observations) are given. Then, transition and observation
models are presented, respectively.
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4.2.1.1 World state definition
The world state of the robot is maintained by using sensory and motor information of
the robot. Table 4.2 lists the observable predicates of the world state that are considered
and the related sensors providing the relevant data.
object predicate is for representing the verified existence of an object. clear is for
stating that the object has nothing on it. onground stands for the situation that an
object is on the ground. segment corresponds to a point cloud clustered in the scene
by the segmentation algorithm but not detected by the vision algorithm. isConflicted
defines that the vision algorithm simultaneously detected more than one object on the
same location. inconsistentObjectModel states that the vision algorithm’s output and
the segmentation algorithm’s output conflict for a specific object. These predicates are
observed with the on-board RGB-D camera using a template-based vision algorithm
in the system.
handempty states that the robot’s gripper is available to hold an object whereas holding
is for stating that an object is grasped by the robot. offset represents the offset of
the robot’s current location considering the feature based localization algorithm and
the robot’s odometer. Observation probabilities are defined regarding to the statistical
analysis on the outputs of the sensors and the related predicate computations. A scene
interpretation [3] approach maintains these predicates in the robot’s knowledge base,
and updates them according to new observations.
Table 4.2: Predicates and the related sensory data.
Predicate Source
object RGB-D Camera
clear RGB-D Camera
onground RGB-D Camera
segment RGB-D Camera
isConflicted RGB-D Camera
inconsistentObjectModel RDB-D Camera
handempty Pressure sensor
holding Pressure sensor
offset Laser Range Finder
A scene interpretation [3] approach maintains these predicates in the robot’s
knowledge base, and updates them according to new observations.
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4.2.1.2 Transition probabilities
Since the model has two hidden states, transition probabilities that define the
probability of transferring from one hidden state to another should be determined.
success failure
initial
0.8 0.2
0.5
0.2
0.5 0.8
Figure 4.3: Transition probabilities of the proposed method.
In Figure 4.3, initial state distribution and hidden states are illustrated. Initially,
probability of being at state success is 0.8 where probability of being at state failure
is 0.2 since it is assumed that the system is in a success state. In a success state,
probability of staying in the same state and passing through the other state is uniformly
distributed. However, since it is more probable to stay in failure state when the robot
is already in failure state, the probability of transferring from state failure to state
failure is higher than the probability of transferring from state failure to state success.
Therefore, this probability is defined as 0.8 where transferring from state failure to
state success is lower with value 0.2.
4.2.1.3 Observation probabilities
Observation probabilities are the components of HMMs that defines the probability of
observing an observation in a hidden state si. Observation probabilities are defined as
Conditional Probability Tables (CPTs) for each failure type.
Note that in the hierarchical structure, all actions have different observations in each
model for different failure types. Therefore, for different failure models, observation
probabilities should be defined.
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Observation models of the proposed method are defined considering the sensory
outputs and statistical information. These probabilities will be explained in detail in
this section.
Conditional Probability Table for the Vision Model
CPT for the vision model is constructed considering the outputs of the vision algorithm
(Table 4.3). For instance, if an object is detected with the RGB-D camera of the robot,
the vision algorithm gives a similarity value considering the template of the object.
This value is used as a probability value for that model. The output of the segmentation
algorithm is also used in the CPT. If an object is not detected with the vision algorithm,
the output of the segmentation algorithm is used. If a point cloud is detected by the
segmentation algorithm, it is more probable that the vision algorithm failed to detect
the object since the performance of the segmentation algorithm is better.
Furthermore, it is also possible that the vision algorithm may falsely classify an object.
In these cases, if the detected size by the vision algorithm and the segmentation
algorithm is quite different, inconsistentObjModel(objX) predicate is observed. This
situation yields to a failure situation more probably. Furthermore, the vision algorithm
may simultaneously detect two different objects in the same location. This situation
is represented as another row in the CPT. Corresponding probabilities can be seen in
Table 4.3. In the CPT, ssuccess and s f ailure rows denote the probability of observing the
corresponding observations in the rows in a success and failure state respectively.
Table 4.3: CPT for the vision model.
Observation ssuccess s f ailure
object(objX) similarity(objX) 1 - similarity(objX)
¬object(objX) ∧ segment(objX) 0.3 0.7
¬object(objX) ∧ ¬segment(objX) 0.7 0.3
inconsistentObjModel(objX) 0.45 0.55
isConflicted(objX) 0.65 0.35
Conditional Probability Table for the External Event Model
CPT for the external model is also constructed considering the outputs of the vision
algorithm (Table 4.4). Situations where the robot detects an object use the similarity
measure as well. Other situations where the object is not detected by the vision
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algorithm but detected with the segmentation algorithm is defined in Table 4.4. Since
the segmentation algorithm is more accurate, probabilities are defined accordingly.
Table 4.4: CPT for the external event model.
Observation ssuccess s f ailure
object(objX) similarity(objX) 1 - similarity(objX)
¬object(objX) ∧ segment(objX) 0.8 0.2
¬object(objX) ∧ ¬segment(objX) 0.35 0.65
According to the table, if the object is not recognized by the vision algorithm but
the segmentation algorithm clusters a segment in the object’s expected position, this
situation is more likely a vision failure and the probability of gathering this observation
in a success state is defined as 0.8. Probability of gathering this observation in a failure
state is defined as 0.2 as well. If both of the algorithms are not able to find a clue about
an object, probability of gathering this observation in a failure state is defined as 0.65.
Conditional Probability Table for the Gripper Model
CPT for the gripper model is defined in Table 4.5. The parameters of this model
is tuned by empirical robot experiments. Several experiments take place in order to
define the parameters of this model. Table 4.5 shows the following probabilities for
the gripper model.
Table 4.5: CPT for the gripper model.
Observation ssuccess s f ailure
holding(robot,objX) 0.75 0.25
handempty(robot) 0.55 0.45
In the table, it is seen that a fix probability is defined for the situations that the robot
can not pick an object up. However, the difference between these two probabilities is
not high since it is not obvious that the gripper is faulty. Therefore, the probability of
observing handempty(robot) after a pick-up action in a success state is 0.55. Similarly,
for the action put-down, same probability values in the CPT are used considering the
natures of the action pick-up and put-down.
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Conditional Probability Table for the Localization Model
CPT for the localization model is defined (Table 4.6) considering the offset between
the odometer and landmark based localization algorithm. Error in the localization is
defined as follows [39]:
Error = |expectedLocation−actualLocation|totalDistanceTravelled
The robot’s localization error value is investigated in both faulty scenarios and normal
scenarios. The error ratio defined above is observed between 0.05 and 0.35. Therefore,
error value is normalized using 2.86 as a normalizing factor (1/0.35 = 2.86). According
to this investigation, error value is mapped into a probability distribution.
Table 4.6: CPT for the localization model.
Observation ssuccess s f ailure
Error 1 - (Error*2.86) (Error*2.86)
4.3 A Running Example
To clarify the proposed method, an object manipulation scenario is illustrated in Figure
4.4. On the top of the figure, the plan generated by the planner is given. In this scenario,
only vision failure model for object A, vision failure model for object B, hardware
limitation (particularly for the gripper) for the robot and localization failure models
are shown.
All of the models are initialized in the beginning. The robot first executes
actionmove-to-obj(A). During the execution of action move-to-obj(A), the localization
failure model and the vision failure model for object A are updated since they are
related to the action. However, the hardware failure model and the vision failure model
for object B are not updated since they are not related to the action in execution.
The next action to be executed in the plan is action pick-up(A). Since this action is
related to the vision model for object A, hardware limitation and localization models,
these models are updated during the execution. These models are labelled as active
models. Vision failure model for object B is not updated since the executed action
is irrelevant for object B. These models are labelled as passive models. At the end
of each action, the corresponding lower level HMM is finalized, a transition is taken,
29
and the upper level HMM is updated. Sequentially, an action is popped from the plan
and update procedure for the contents of the states are done. Action-failure relations
are checked considering the parameters and active models are found. Similarly, these
operations are applied for all actions in the given plan.
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5. EXPERIMENTS
In this chapter, experimental setup is first presented. Then, the evaluation of the system
on real robot scenarios is analysed.
5.1 Experimental Setup
In the experiments, Pioneer 3-AT (Figure 5.1) robot is equipped with a gripper, a
sonar ring, and an RGB-D camera is used. Objects are recognized using LINEMOD
algorithm [40,41] with RGB-D camera which gathers depth information of the objects
with color information (Figure 5.2). Templates of the objects are stored in the
knowledge base (KB) of the robot and during the execution of a task, point clouds from
the scene are compared with the templates of the robot. If a point cloud is matched
with a template, object is recognized with a similarity measure.
Figure 5.1: (Left) Pioneer 3-AT robot; (right) objects that are used in the experiments.
A depth-based segmentation algorithm is also run for detecting point clusters
(segments) of the scene beside the template-based object recognition algorithm.
Organized Point Cloud Segmentation [42] is used to extract clusters/segments from
the scene gathered with the RGB-D camera (Figure 5.2). Clusters that are larger or
smaller than given a threshold are discarded. Note that segments clustered with the
segmentation algorithm are classified as unknown objects, these segments do not have
an object type.
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Figure 5.2: (Left) Outputs of the LINEMOD and (right) segmentation algorithms [3].
Experiments take place in a laboratory environment that contains objects placed on the
ground. The experiments are performed on three objects: a blue plastic bowling pin, a
beach volleyball, and a small plastic purple ball (Figure 5.1).
Given an initial and goal state, the robot takes consecutive actions in order to reach
the goal. In the symbolic level, the robot maintains the models of its operators
corresponding to the actions that it can execute in the real world. Each action is
represented by a set of facts to be satisfied before executing it, namely, preconditions,
and effects that occur in the world after the action is executed by the robot. In an
object manipulation scenario, the robot’s goal is to transport objects to a destination.
Initially, all objects are in their initial positions. The robot is capable of executing some
actions namely move-to-loc, pick-up, put-down and move-to-obj. Action move-to-loc
is executed in order to move the robot to a location, whereas action move-to-obj moves
the robot to a desired object location. Action pick-up is to pick up an object by the
robot’s gripper. Similarly, action put-down is executed for releasing an object from the
gripper on the ground.
5.2 Experimental Results
In this section, the performance of the proposed method is analysed. First, some
case scenarios and the corresponding probabilities are investigated. Afterwards, the
performance analysis of the proposed method is given on a more extended set of
experiments. Then, results of the failure isolation problem using Particle Filters are
given. At the end, memory analysis of the proposed method is investigated.
34
Figure 5.3: (Left) The vision algorithm detects a small ball on the boundary of the big
ball. (Right) The segmentation algorithm correctly clusters the point cloud
of the big ball.
5.2.1 Case scenarios
The performance of the proposed method is first analysed on some case scenarios.
In vision failure scenarios, object B is misrecognised by the vision algorithm due to
the missing template model of the object. Therefore, the vision algorithm classified
the volleyball as a small ball. In gripper failure scenarios, the controller of the robot
is changed in such a way that the robot is not able to close its gripper. In external
event scenarios, object A is taken out of the scene by a human from the environment
during runtime. In localization failure scenarios, the robot’s location is manipulated by
changing its position during the execution of an action.
5.2.1.1 Scenario I
In this scenario, the robot is tasked to move the pin (objA) and the beach ball (objB)
to their desired destinations. Although the robot can correctly localize the pin, it fails
in correctly recognizing the ball. Since the vision algorithm searches the objects by
considering their surface normals, it falsely detects a small ball on the left boundary
of the ball (Figure 5.3) due to the similarity of the objects’ surface normals. This
affects the parameters of the action pick-up. Therefore, the robot fails in picking up
the ball with its gripper. After the failure, the robot is intentionally allowed to retry the
action three more times. Since the pin is successfully recognized, action pick-up on
this object is taken without any failure. The robot directly tries to move the object to
the destination and puts it down.
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Figure 5.4: A consistent vision failure for a particular object results in an increase in
the corresponding probability.
Figure 5.4 illustrates how the posteriors on failure models change during the execution
of each action. Six failure types are considered. As clearly seen from the figure,
during the execution of action move-to-obj(A) and pick-up(A), vision failure is not
observed, therefore, the probabilities are stable during these time steps. Note that in
the plots, letters s and f next to the actions represent the action is succeeded or failed,
respectively.
The vision failure probability for B starts to increase after the execution of action
move-to-obj(B) due to the conflicts in the results of the vision algorithm and the
detected sizes of the object by segmentation. This situation may result with setting
the parameter of the action pick-up wrong. Note that even when there is this type of
vision failure, it is possible to successfully pick up the object if the center of recognition
intersects with the center of the original object, but this is not the case in this scenario.
It is also seen from the figure that while the robot attempts to pick up B, the probability
of having a hardware failure (gripper) increases due to the propagation of the failure
over time.
5.2.1.2 Scenario II
To test the performance of the system to detect a hardware malfunction, a hand-made
gripper failure is injected to the robot. This is simulated by preventing the gripper from
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closing completely and by closing the sensory feedback in software to detect the state
of the gripper.
In the beginning of the execution, the planner generates a plan in order to transfer
the objects to their desired locations. The planner generates a plan as follows:
{move-to-obj(A) - pick-up(A) - move-to-loc(dest) - put-down(A) - move-to-obj(B) -
pick-up(B) - move-to-loc(dest) - put-down(B)}.
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Figure 5.5: A hand-made gripper failure is injected into the system. Probabilities
change accordingly.
The robot tries to pick up the plastic pin (objA) and the small ball (objB) but fails all the
time for both objects due to the simulated failure in its gripper. Resulting probability
values can be seen in the Figure 5.5. According to the figure, the robot’s belief on
gripper fault increases for each trial.
Other models’ probability values are stable during the execution of the given plan
since no indication of a failure is observed. Only small changes in the localization
model occurs due to the increase in the offset of the robot considering its odometer and
feature based localization algorithm. However, this situation is fixed in future steps of
the plan. At the end of execution, it can be seen from the figure that probability of
having a gripper failure is 0.76. Other models’ probability values are stable during the
execution of the plan. As a result, the method proposes the gripper model as the cause
of the failure.
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5.2.1.3 Scenario III
In this scenario, failures due to external events are analysed. For this purpose, the
object is manipulated by a human. Two objects (the pin and the small ball) are used
and the pin (objA) is taken out of the environment by the human while the robot moves
towards that object.
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Figure 5.6: The resulting probabilities when an external event exists in the scene.
In order to collect the object in their desired positions, the planner generates a sequence
of actions to be executed. The planner generates a plan as follows: {move-to-obj(A)
- pick-up(A) - move-to-loc(dest) - put-down(A) - move-to-obj(B) - pick-up(B) -
move-to-loc(dest) - put-down(B)}.
Since the object is taken out of the environment, action move-to-obj(objA) fails.
According to Figure 5.6, the robot increases its belief on an external event when the
object disappears from the robot’s view. The segmentation algorithm’s output also
suggests this hypothesis. However, the vision failure for the object A is also in one of
the likely hypotheses.
During the execution of action move-to-obj(A), belief on a localization failure is
increased due to the offset between the feature based localization algorithm and the
odometer. However, this is fixed in the future steps of the plan execution.
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5.2.1.4 Scenario IV
In this scenario, failures due to the situations where the robot can not localize itself
is presented. During the execution of move-to-obj(A) action, the robot is moved to
another location by a human. A plastic pin (objA) and a small ball (objB) is used in
this experiment.
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Figure 5.7: The resulting probabilities when a localization failure occurs.
According to Figure 5.7, the robot increases its belief on a localization failure due to
the offset between the odometer and localization algorithm due to the increase in the
offset of the robot that the localization algorithm returns. This offset causes an increase
in the corresponding probability during the execution of actions move-to-obj(A) and
pick(A). However, this posterior drops later since the robot tries to fix its localization
error during execution. Probability of a malfunction in the gripper is also possible since
there is a fixed probability for each trial when the robot can not pick the object up with
its gripper. The robot also increases its belief on an external event when its location is
changed due to the disappearance of the object from the point of view. However, this
posterior is dropped when the object is detected by the robot later.
5.2.1.5 Scenario V
In this scenario, two objects are used. The first object is taken out of the environment
during the robot moves towards it. The other object is misrecognised by the vision
algorithm. The resulting probabilities can be seen in Figure 5.8.
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Figure 5.8: Both an external event and vision failure occur in the environment.
Probabilities change accordingly.
The robot can not detect object A while executing action move-to-obj(A). Therefore, the
belief on an external event on this object increases. Then, the robot starts to execute
the actions related to object B. Since the sizes of the object detected by the vision
algorithm and segmentation algorithm conflict, the belief of a vision failure on object
A increases. This scenario shows that the HHMM-based failure isolation method can
track more than one failure since the failure models are independent from each other.
5.2.1.6 Scenario VI
In this scenario, a complex scenario with three objects and multiple failures is
investigated. The first object (objA) is taken out of the environment while the robot
moves towards the object. A gripper failure is also injected to the software of the
robot. Moreover, the third object (objC) has a vision failure.
Figure 5.9 shows the changes in the calculated probability values during the execution
of the given plan. During the robot executes action pick-up(A), the belief on an external
event increases since the robot can not detect the object with the vision algorithm.
Vision failure probability on that object also increases since this situation may be
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Figure 5.9: An external event, a gripper failure and a vision failure occur in the
environment.
because of an error on the vision algorithm. For each trial of action pick-up, the belief
of a gripper failure also increases.
5.2.2 Performance evaluation
Performance of the proposed method is analysed on several failure scenarios. 40 real
robot scenarios are investigated. Each of 10 scenarios include vision failure on an
object, gripper failure, external event on an object and localization failure.
Since the proposed method uses a hierarchy, the following three tables show the
analysis of different probability transfer strategies from the lower level models to upper
level models.
5.2.2.1 Performance analysis of the method with maximum failure probability
transfer values
In Table 5.1, each row represents the means (µ) of the probability values and the
standard deviations (σ ) for each failure model in the corresponding 10 scenarios. For
example, in the first row, a vision failure on object B is investigated. According to the
table, the proposed method suggests that the cause of the failure in the first 10 scenarios
is due to a vision failure on the object A with 0.11 probability on average, a vision
failure on the object B with 0.93 probability, a gripper failure with 0.61 probability,
an external event on object A with 0.12 probability, an external event on object B
41
with 0.15 probability and localization failure with 0.10 probability. Standard deviation
values are 0.01, 0.02, 0.05, 0.02, 0.03 and 0.09 for the failure models, respectively.
Similarly, the other rows represent the means of the probability values (µ) and the
standard deviations (σ ) of each of the 10 scenarios that the proposed method suggests
for each failure type. Standard deviations of vision models are high for some failure
cases (in gripper scenarios for Vision A and in localization scenarios for Vision B)
since there are also some vision failures in these scenarios.
Table 5.1: Performance analysis of the method with maximum probability transfer
values.
Failure Type Vision A Vision B Gripper External A External B Localization
Scenarios µ σ µ σ µ σ µ σ µ σ µ σ
Vision B 0.11 0.01 0.93 0.02 0.61 0.05 0.12 0.02 0.15 0.03 0.10 0.09
External A 0.35 0.02 0.13 0.03 0.09 0.03 0.90 0.08 0.15 0.08 0.17 0.17
Gripper 0.24 0.22 0.18 0.11 0.77 0.00 0.16 0.08 0.26 0.22 0.14 0.04
Localization 0.22 0.10 0.11 0.02 0.69 0.19 0.37 0.28 0.11 0.00 0.98 0.02
From the table, it can be seen that HHMM-based failure isolation strategy efficiently
explains failure cases when a failure occurs. When the rows are interpreted, it
can be inferred that the proposed method explains faulty situations with the highest
probability on average.
5.2.2.2 Performance analysis of the method with average of the failure probability
transfer values
In the analysis above, instant failure situations such as misrecognizing an object just
for a time step are also transferred to the upper level in the hierarchy since it uses the
highest failure probability value during taking a transition to the upper level.
Table 5.2: Performance analysis of the method using average approach values.
Failure Type Vision A Vision B Gripper External A External B Localization
Scenarios µ σ µ σ µ σ µ σ µ σ µ σ
Vision B 0.10 0.01 0.44 0.15 0.13 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.12 0.05
External A 0.32 0.02 0.11 0.02 0.09 0.03 0.82 0.10 0.11 0.02 0.12 0.02
Gripper 0.14 0.06 0.12 0.03 0.17 0.02 0.11 0.02 0.11 0.01 0.12 0.01
Localization 0.15 0.07 0.08 0.02 0.16 0.03 0.20 0.21 0.08 0.02 0.95 0.02
In order to eliminate these instant failures, average of the failure values may be
transferred to the upper level. In Table 5.2, the corresponding results can be seen when
averages of the failure probabilities are used while transferring to the upper level.
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It can be seen from the table that although instant failures can be eliminated, the overall
performance of the system decreases. Therefore, it is not efficient to use the average
probabilities all the time.
5.2.2.3 Performance analysis of the method with the hybrid approach
The maximum probability approach can not eliminate instant failures. However,
average probabilities can eliminate these instant failures. Therefore, the sequence of
the hidden states should be considered in order to decide which probability value to
transfer to the upper level. Considering the sequence of the hidden states, if failure
situations are followed with success states, then the average of the failure probabilities
is transferred to the upper level. Otherwise, the maximum failure probability value is
transferred to the upper level.
In the Table 5.3, it can be seen that hybrid approach eliminates instant failures. For
example, for all scenarios, instant vision failures on object B are eliminated. Similarly,
the mean probability of the external event on the object B decreases.
Table 5.3: Performance analysis of the method using hybrid approach.
Failure Type Vision A Vision B Gripper External A External B Localization
Scenarios µ σ µ σ µ σ µ σ µ σ µ σ
Vision B 0.11 0.01 0.80 0.16 0.61 0.05 0.11 0.01 0.15 0.03 0.10 0.2
External A 0.35 0.02 0.13 0.03 0.08 0.04 0.90 0.03 0.15 0.08 0.17 0.05
Gripper 0.17 0.11 0.18 0.11 0.77 0.00 0.16 0.08 0.15 0.04 0.14 0.05
Localization 0.22 0.11 0.11 0.02 0.69 0.19 0.34 0.28 0.11 0.03 0.98 0.02
5.2.2.4 Performance analysis of the method with Particle Filters
In order to compare the proposed method, a Particle Filter based method is applied to
the failure isolation problem.
Particle Filters (PFs) are probabilistic models and their underlying model is Bayesian
Filters [43]. A Particle Filter consists of a number of particles. Each particle represents
the system’s belief on the state of the system. Therefore, belief of the system is
represented with the particles. Higher density of the particles on a region means that
the belief on that state is more probable. A general Particle Filter algorithm includes
3 main steps, prediction, importance sampling and resampling. First, particles are
distributed considering the initial probability distribution. After, prediction step takes
place. Particles are drawn among the states considering the transition model of the
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system. When an observation is gathered, importance sampling is done, particles
are weighted considering the observation probabilities. Then a resampling process
is applied and particles are drawn considering their weights. After resampling process,
the number of particles is protected. Therefore, at the end of the algorithm, the number
of particles is the same as the initialization step.
In order to represent failure isolation problem with Particle Filters, each failure type
is modelled as a distinct Particle Filter. For instance, there are six Particle Filters for
the object manipulation scenario with two objects, namely, vision failure on object
A, vision failure on object B, external event on object A, external event on object B,
localization and hardware (gripper). After an action is executed, the maximum failure
observation probability is used to weight the related PF. Since the failure isolation
problem includes two hidden states, in each step of the Particle Filter algorithm,
particles are drawn between these two states. Same parameters are used to model
the Particle Filters. In the experiments, the number of particles is set to 5000. The
results from the robotic experiments with Particle Filtering method is given in Table
5.4.
Table 5.4: Performance analysis of the method with Particle Filters.
Failure Type Vision A Vision B Gripper External A External B Localization
Scenarios µ σ µ σ µ σ µ σ µ σ µ σ
Vision B 0.14 0.02 0.70 0.02 0.64 0.01 0.15 0.06 0.17 0.03 0.15 0.01
External A 0.39 0.04 0.17 0.04 0.12 0.02 0.71 0.06 0.18 0.05 0.19 0.05
Gripper 0.24 0.17 0.21 0.12 0.65 0.01 0.18 0.07 0.18 0.04 0.18 0.09
Localization 0.30 0.12 0.12 0.02 0.59 0.16 0.36 0.22 0.15 0.01 0.97 0.02
It can be clearly seen from the Figure 5.4 that Hierarchical Hidden Markov Models
outperforms Particle Filters for failure isolation problem. Since HMMs are represented
hierarchically, the problem of failure isolation can be modelled more efficiently than
Particle Filters.
5.2.3 Analysis of memory usage
In all the investigated scenarios, the size of the state space is analysed. It is shown
that use of action-failure type relations reduces the number of states generated in our
method (Table 5.5). In the table, the number of states with and without using relations
(Table 4.1) and the average percentage of gain in terms of memory utilization are
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presented for 40 real robot experiments. The overall memory reduction is 43.36%
for these scenarios.
Table 5.5: Analysis of state generation on HHMMs.
Scenario
# of States # of States
Gain
w/o relations w/ relations
Vision Failure 457 245 %46.47
Gripper Failure 491 320 %34.93
External Event 260 118 %54.61
Localization Failure 539 338 %37.32
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6. CONCLUSION
In this thesis, a temporal model for failure isolation that employs HHMMs is presented.
Propagation property of the HMMs are used to model the continuousness of the
failures. HHMMs are for modelling the possible failure types that a cognitive robot
faces. Each failure type is represented as a distinct HHMM and relevant models are
updated during the execution of the plan. Action-failure type relations and parameters
of the actions are used to reduce the size of the generated state space.
Moreover, HHMMs ensure isolation of multiple faults and propose explanations for
possible failure situations. Since the failures are modelled in parallel, each model is
able to generate a probability in case of a failure. This property makes it possible to
isolate multiple faults.
Due to hierarchical structure of the HMM, each action has its own probabilistic model
for each failure type. This property also provides the opportunity to isolate persistent
failures on a specific object or event. Modelling each failure type as a distinct model
provides a simple yet effective representation.
Experimental results on several failure cases show that the proposed method can
successfully suggest reasonable causes for detected failures. Considering the
calculated probability for each model, candidate models can be interpreted considering
their probabilities.
The main drawback of the proposed method is its model-based structure like all other
model-based methods. Failures that don’t have a model can not be isolated. Therefore,
failure models should be defined for the system to isolate these type of failures.
6.1 Future Work
As a future work, isolation results will be used for the future plans of the robot.
Therefore, the outcomes of the isolation process will be used as an input to a learning
phase.
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Since the proposed method is model-based, isolating non-modelled failures is hard.
Therefore, new failure types will be added to the system in order to isolate more
failures.
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